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Abstract. Bell’s theorem admits several interpretations or ‘solutions’, the standard 
interpretation being ‘indeterminism’, a next one ‘nonlocality’. In this article two further 
solutions are investigated, termed here ‘superdeterminism’ and ‘supercorrelation’. The 
former is especially interesting for philosophical reasons, if only because it is always rejected 
on the basis of extra-physical arguments. The latter, supercorrelation, will be studied here by 
investigating model systems that can mimic it, namely spin lattices. It is shown that in these 
systems the Bell inequality can be violated, even if they are local according to usual 
definitions. Violation of the Bell inequality is retraced to violation of ‘measurement 
independence’. These results emphasize the importance of studying the premises of the Bell 
inequality in realistic systems.  
 
1. Introduction. 
 Arguably no physical theorem highlights the peculiarities of quantum mechanics with more 
clarity than Bell’s theorem [1-3]. Bell succeeded in deriving an experimentally testable criterion that 
would eliminate at least one of a few utterly fundamental hypotheses of physics. Despite the 
mathematical simplicity of Bell’s original article, its interpretation – the meaning of the premises and 
consequences of the theorem, the ‘solutions’ left - has given rise to a vast secondary literature. Bell’s 
premises and conclusions can be given various formulations, of which it is not immediately obvious 
that they are equivalent to the original phrasing; several types of ‘Bell theorems’ can be proven within 
different mathematical assumptions. As a consequence, after more than 40 years of research, there is 
no real consensus on several interpretational questions.  
 In the present article we will argue that at least two solutions to Bell’s theorem have been 
unduly neglected by the physics and quantum philosophy communities. To make a self-contained 
discussion, we will start (Section 2) by succinctly reviewing the precise premises on which the Bell 
inequality (BI) is based. In the case of the deterministic variant of Bell’s theorem these premises 
comprise locality and ‘measurement independence’ (MI); for the stochastic variant they are MI, 
‘outcome independence’ (OI) and ‘parameter independence’ [4-6]. Rejecting one of these premises 
corresponds to a possible solution or interpretation of Bell’s theorem - if it is physically sound. In 
Section 3 we will succinctly review well-known positions, which can be termed ‘indeterminism’ (the 
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orthodox position) and ‘nonlocality’ (in Bell’s strong sense), and give essential arguments in favor 
and against them. We believe this is not a luxury, since it seems that quite some confusion exists in 
the literature: popular slogans such as ‘the world is nonlocal’, ‘local realism is dead’, ‘the quantum 
world is indeterministic’ are not proven consequences of a physical theory, but metaphysical 
conjectures among others - or even misnomers. It is therefore useful to clearly distinguish what is 
proven within a physics theory, and what is metaphysical, i.e. what is not part of physics in the strict 
sense. All solutions to Bell’s theorem are the conjunction of physical and metaphysical arguments.        
The first position we will investigate here in more detail (Section 4), and that is usually termed 
total or ‘superdeterminism’ is, although known, rarely considered a serious option (notable exceptions 
exist [6-11]). The negative reception of this interpretation is based on arguments of ‘free will’ or 
conspiracy, which are however heavily metaphysically tainted. We will argue that rejection of 
determinism on the basis of these arguments is in a sense surprising, since it corresponds to a 
worldview that has been convincingly defended by scholars since centuries; and especially since it is 
arguably the simplest model that agrees with the facts. (The Appendix gives a condensed overview of 
the history of this position, where a special place is given to Spinoza.) Its main drawback however – 
for physicists – is that it seems difficult to convert into a fully physical theory.  
In Section 5 we will argue a fourth solution exists, which could be termed ‘supercorrelation’, 
and which does not have the latter disadvantage – it is essentially a physical model. In order to 
investigate its soundness, we will study highly correlated model systems, namely spin lattices. It will 
be shown that in a Bell-type correlation experiment on such lattices the Bell inequality can be strongly 
violated; yet these systems are ‘local’ according to usual definitions [1, 12]. This violation will be 
retraced to violation of MI. It will be argued that a similar ‘supercorrelation’ may happen in the real 
Bell experiment. This will lead us to the conclusion that the premises on which Bell’s theorem is 
based, such as MI, OI and PI, are extremely subtle, and that it is highly desirable to study them in 
realistic physical systems, not just by abstract reasoning.  
Two words of caution are in place. The first is that we will not try to elaborate here a realistic 
hidden variable theory for quantum mechanics, which seems a daunting task; we are concerned with 
the much more modest question whether such theories are possible. We are well aware that this 
implies quite some speculation; but in view of the extraordinary importance of Bell’s theorem for 
physics (and philosophy) such efforts seem justified, especially if arguments can be backed-up by 
physical models. Second, there exist many highly valuable contributions to the present field, both 
experimental and theoretical. It would be far outside the scope of this article to review these works; 
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we could only refer to the texts that were most relevant for the present findings. Let us however start 
by paying tribute to Bell himself: his texts [1-3] remain landmarks of clarity, simplicity, and precision.  
 
2. Assumptions for deriving the Bell Inequality (BI). 
For following discussion it will prove useful to distinguish the deterministic and stochastic 
variant of Bell’s theorem. Within a deterministic hidden variable theory (HVT), the outcomes 1 and 
2 (say spin) of a Bell-type correlation experiment are supposed to be deterministic functions of some 
‘hidden variables’ (HVs) , i.e. 
                                      1 = 1(a,) and 2 = 2(b,),                                                              (1) 
where a and b are the left and right analyzer directions. (In the following  may be a set or represent 
values of fields; the HVs may be split in 1, 2 etc.: all these cases fall under Bell’s analysis.) Recall 
that (1) assumes ‘locality’1: 1 does not depend on b, and 2 not on a. In Bell’s original 1964 article 
[1] it is assumed that the mean product M(a,b) = < 1.2 >a,b can be written as  
                                     M(a,b) = < 1.2 >a,b =  1(a,).2(b,)..d.                                           (2)  
In the most general case however  in (2) should be written as a conditional probability density 
(|a,b) [4-6]. Indeed, it is essential to realize that from (2) the BI can only be derived if one also 
supposes that  
                             (|a,b) = (|a’,b’) ≡ () for all relevant , a, b, a’, b’        (MI),                         (3) 
a condition usually termed ‘measurement independence’ (MI) [5-6,11]. This hypothesis expresses that 
 is stochastically independent of the variable couple (a,b), for all relevant values of a, b and . There 
are of course good reasons to suppose that (3) indeed holds. In an experiment with sufficiently rapidly 
varying analyzer settings [13], creating a spacelike separation between the left and right measurement 
events, it would seem that the value of  determining 1 on the left cannot depend on the simultaneous 
value of b on the right (similarly for 2 and a) – at least if one assumes Bell’s relativistic locality (see 
footnote 1). So this argument says that  cannot depend on both a and b, i.e. that MI in (3) holds as a 
consequence of locality.  
                                                          
1
 According to Bell’s original [1], a HVT is local iff 1) the force fields the theory invokes are well-localized (they drop off 
after a certain distance, therefore (1) can be assumed even in an experiment with static settings); and 2) it does not invoke 
action at-a-distance, i.e. it invokes only influences that propagate at a (sub)luminal speed, in particular between the ‘left’ 
and ‘right’ part of the experiment. Notice this corresponds to an extremely mild locality condition: any known physical 
system satisfies it.  
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Before critically analyzing MI in Sections 4 and 5, let us already observe that it has never been 
rigorously proven that Bell’s locality necessarily implies MI. One may well wonder whether this view 
captures all cases, and whether MI can be violated even in local systems. Shimony, Horne and Clauser 
[14] observed that ‘measurement dependence’, i.e. stochastic dependence of  on (a,b), could in 
principle arise if the (values of the) variables , a, and b have local common causes in their 
overlapping backward light-cones. More generally, it is maybe conceivable that local correlations exist 
between  and (a,b) at the moment of measurement which are a remnant of their common causal past; 
this is a more general variant of the argument in [14] to be discussed in Section 5. The fact is that the 
counterargument of Shimony et al. against (3) seems to have had little impact in the literature. It has 
been discussed in a series of articles [14] by Shimony, Horne, Clauser and Bell (reviewed in [15]). All 
come to the conclusion that (3) should be valid on the basis of a ‘free will’ argument, a position which 
seems largely dominant till date. According to the latter view, if  would depend on a and b, then a 
and b should depend on  (due to the standard reciprocity of probabilistic dependence). But the values 
of a and b can be freely chosen by one or even two experimenters; how then could they depend on 
HVs  that moreover determine the measurement outcomes 1 and 2 ? Ergo, MI must hold. However, 
we will prove in Section 5.1. that this ‘free will’ argument is plainly false.  
 In sum, assuming (1), the existence of local deterministic HVs, locality, and (3), MI, one 
derives the Bell-CHSH [16] inequality:  
                                      XBI =  M(a,b) + M(a’,b) + M(a,b’) – M(a’,b’)   ≤   2                                       (4) 
by using only algebra. Many have summarized that (4) follows from the assumptions of ‘HVs and 
locality’ or from ‘local HVs’. But, as we showed above, this phrasing is only valid if locality implies 
MI.     
 After Bell’s seminal work, Clauser and Horne [12], Bell [2] and others extended the original 
theorem to stochastic HVTs. In such a HVT 1 and 2 are probabilistic variables, for which one 
assumes (instead of (1)) that 
                                            P(1|a,), P(2|b,) and P(1,2|a,b,) exist.                                             (5)    
If 1 and 2 are stochastic variables one has now (instead of (2)) that  
                                       M(a,b) = < 1.2 >a,b = 
 11

 12
1.2.P(1,2|a,b),                                       (6) 
where P(1,2|a,b) is the joint probability that 1 and 2 each have a certain value (+1 or -1) given that 
the analyzer variables take values a and b (all this in the Bell experiment). Assuming (5), the existence 
of HVs, and exactly the same condition (3) (MI) as before, it follows from (6) that 
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                         M(a,b) = < 1.2 >a,b = 
 11

 12
 1.2.  P(1,2|a,b,).().d.                                (7) 
To derive the Bell inequality (4) one has now to make two supplementary assumptions [4-6], usually 
termed ‘outcome independence’ (OI) and ‘parameter independence’ (PI), which are defined as 
follows: 
                                  P(1|2,a,b,) = P(1|a,b,) for all (,1,2)                       (OI),                        (8) 
                               P(2|a,b,) = P(2|b,) for all  and similarly for 1             (PI).                          (9) 
Using (8-9) one derives from (7) that 
                             M(a,b) = 
 11

 12
1.2.  P(1|a,).P(2|b,).().d,                                          (10) 
from which the same BI as before (see Eq. (4)) follows by using only algebra. Note that the original 
work by Clauser and Horne [12] assumed the so-called ‘factorability’ condition 
                            P(1,2|a,b,) = P(1|a,).P(2|b,)       for all (,1,2),                                        (11) 
which is however simply the conjunction of (8) and (9). Clauser and Horne justified their assumption 
Eq. (11) by stating that it is ‘reasonable locality condition’; Einstein locality manifests itself in (11) by 
the fact that P(1|a,) does not depend on b; similarly for P(2|b,) [12, 2]. Since then the factorability 
condition (11) seems to have become in the literature the definition of locality in stochastic systems. 
(However, even if (11) or OI and PI may be found ‘reasonable’ in a Bell experiment with spacelike 
separation between the left and right measurements, one may doubt their general validity – e.g. for the 
same reasons for which MI may be questioned. We will come back to this point in Section 5.) 
 Thus, for stochastic HVTs the Bell-CHSH inequality (4) follows from the assumption of MI, 
OI and PI. Actually, it appears that all known derivations of generalized Bell inequalities are based on 
assumptions equivalent to (or stronger than) OI, MI and PI [6]. A more generally known phrasing is 
that the BI (4) follows from the assumption of ‘HVs and locality’. But again, here it must be assumed 
that locality implies MI, OI and PI; an unproven hypothesis.  
 
3. The obvious solutions to Bell’s theorem: Indeterminism (S1) and Nonlocality (S2). 
In the present Section we will have a brief look at well-known positions which may be adopted 
with respect to Bell’s theorem and the experimental results (we do not claim to review all admissible 
solutions). This exercise has been done before (see e.g. [2,3,8,10,17]), but it still seems useful to 
highlight some pitfalls; simply recognizing that all solutions to Bell’s theorem have both a physical 
and a metaphysical component will already prove helpful. Let us first summarize the discussion of 
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Section 2 in its most precise and presumably least controversial manner. In the case of deterministic 
HVTs, the BI (4) follows from the following assumptions or conditions (C1-C3): 
                                                      The existence of deterministic HVs   (see Eq. (1))        (C1) 
                                                      Locality   (see footnote 1)                                              (C2) 
                                                      Measurement independence (MI)  (see (3)).                (C3) 
 In the case of stochastic HVTs, the BI (4) is derived based on following hypotheses: 
        The existence of stochastic HVs   (see Eq. (5))            (C4) 
                                                       Measurement independence (MI)   (see (3))                (C3) 
                                                       Outcome Independence (OI)   (see (8))                        (C5) 
                                                       Parameter Independence (PI)   (see (9)).                    (C6) 
Since in the Bell experiment the BI (4) is violated (e.g. if the particle pair is in the singlet state), and 
quantum mechanics vindicated, one simply infers that at least one of the assumptions (C1 – C3) must 
be false; and that at least one of the conditions (C3 – C6) must be false. Rejection of one particular of 
these assumptions corresponds to one of the admissible interpretations or solutions of Bell’s theorem, 
if it is physically meaningful. If one can legitimately assume that MI, OI, and PI follow from locality 
then one can resume Bell’s theorem in the following condensed way2:  
                      Local HVTs (deterministic and stochastic) are impossible.       (B1) 
This is indeed the phrasing that could resume the work of Bell [1-3] and many others since. Since 
(B1) is so popular we will first have a closer look at it, but it is important to remember that the 
conditions (C1-C3) and (C3-C6) are a more precise (and more recent) starting point to analyze Bell’s 
theorem [4-6]; they are at the basis of further solutions. Also recall that (B1) does not only apply to 
Bell’s original spin correlation experiment, but to any entangled state of two quantum systems.  
In particular, (B1) says that nature, or in any case a broad class of correlated quantum 
phenomena, cannot be described by a theory that is both local and more complete than quantum 
mechanics. Several articles helpful to understand the full scope of (B1) have derived Bell’s theorem 
without explicitly invoking hidden variables [18-20]. Instead of hidden variables they assume that the 
physical properties 1 and 2 measured in Bell’s experiment have an objective value even before the 
                                                          
2
 (B1) takes the (almost ideal) experimental results into account. Here we do not consider certain so-called loopholes 
linked to the fact that real Bell experiments would not be 100% faithful tests of the theorem (these loopholes seem to 
become more and more unlikely). 
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measurement: a hypothesis generally termed ‘realism’. These works have thus led to following 
popular variant of (B1):  
                           Local realistic theories are impossible.                 (B2) 
Since the assumptions leading to the conclusions (B1) and (B2) lead to exactly the same type of 
mathematical inequality (4), it is only logical to suppose that also (B1) and (B2) are equivalent. This is 
indeed the case, at least for deterministic HVTs
3
. But since (B1) also includes stochastic HVTs, it is 
more general and more precise than (B2); (B1) would thus explain what ‘realistic’ in (B2) really 
means. Moreover, it should be noted that the term ‘realistic’ as used by the community of quantum 
philosophers and physicists might give rise to confusion. In the original meaning of the word, as used 
by the broad community of philosophers, ‘realism’ is the hypothesis that the physical world (e.g. 
physical properties and their values) exists independently of the human mind [21-22]. Bohr was 
doubtlessly a realist in the latter, original sense [23]; but he was as surely a non-realist in the sense 
used in (B2). According to Bohr, the measurement apparatus determines the values of quantum 
properties i, not the human mind [24]. For these reasons we will rely in this Section on Bell’s 
original phrasing (B1), excelling in clarity, rather than on (B2).   
 Some authors have concluded from the observation that quantum mechanics rules out ‘any’ 
local HVT (understood: both deterministic and probabilistic), that the conflict arises because of the 
locality condition alone: it would then be proven by Bell’s theorem (and the experiments) that 
quantum systems are necessarily nonlocal
4
. This interpretation of Bell’s theorem is widespread (see 
e.g. [25] and [8] Chap. 6). However, it is crucial to realize that it is not a proven result: it is one 
possible interpretation (see S2 below), and certainly not the only admissible position (unless one 
redefines ‘nonlocal’ of course). Moreover, it appears that the nonlocality that is invoked by these 
authors is of a strange kind: it cannot be used for superluminal signal exchange [8]. Alain Aspect and 
Asher Peres, for instance, term the photon pair of the Bell experiment a ‘single non-separable’ or a 
‘single indivisible, nonlocal’ object ([25], [8] Chap. 6). But does this really help to understand the 
correlations in the Bell experiment ? In Bell’s work nonlocality straightforwardly refers to 
superluminal interactions or signals; but not so in the latter interpretation of nonlocality. It seems that 
Peres attempts, in certain texts (e.g. [8] Chap. 6), to explain quantum nonlocality by the intuitive idea 
                                                          
3
 This may be shown as follows. In a deterministic HVT the physical properties 1 and 2 have a value before each 
instance of measurement (since i is determined by, i.e. a function of, ); conversely, in a realistic theory 1 and 2 have a 
value even before measurement and one can, implicitly or explicitly, index that value by a hidden variable or index.  
4
 Here ‘nonlocal’ cannot mean ‘entangled’ because entanglement is of course not proven by Bell’s theorem. In 
information-theoretic texts ‘nonlocal’ is often synonymous to ‘violating the BI’, but in our discussion the term is obviously 
not used in that way.   
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that in ‘one indivisible object’, if one part ‘feels’ something, any distant part of the same object 
immediately also ‘feels’ something. But this is not a description of what happens in any normal solid 
object, in which an influence (a force) exerted on one part propagates to any other part at subluminal 
speed.  
 Obvious interpretations of Bell’s theorem, then, are an immediate consequence of (B1).    
S1. The Standard Solution (‘indeterminism’). The orthodox position, probably adopted by a 
majority of physicists, is to reject Bell’s ‘hidden variable’ hypothesis (C1 and C4). So according to 
this position there are no hidden variables completing quantum mechanics (for the Bell experiment 
and other entangled systems), not even in principle. As argued above, rejection of deterministic HVs 
amounts to rejecting a special kind of ‘realism’, more precisely to rejecting the thesis that the values 
of the quantum properties 1 and 2 (of Bell’s experiment) exist even before their measurement. This 
is the orthodox position because it has in essence been anticipated by Bohr decades before Bell’s 
discovery [1] – it is part of the original Copenhagen interpretation ! [23-24, 8] Indeed, in 1935 Bohr 
had dismissed the EPR paradox by invoking this position. As we read it, Bohr’s anti-EPR argument 
[24] can be summarized as follows: measurement brings observables into being through an inevitable 
interaction with an observing system; if two observables cannot be measured simultaneously, they do 
not exist simultaneously. Bohr might have similarly argued that the values of the quantum properties 
1 and 2 of Bell’s experiment do not exist before measurement, are not determined, i.e. Bell’s 
theorem (B1) or (B2) is not valid.  
(It seems that there is one small cloud that stains this perfect picture, namely the fact that this 
argument à la Bohr does not immediately explain why stochastic HVTs would be inconceivable. But 
advocates of S1 could invoke a remarkable result by Fine [26], proving the equivalence between the 
existence of stochastic and of deterministic HVTs. And we will see further that Bohr might have 
resorted to a second argument, linked to the ‘contextuality’ of the Bell experiment, i.e. the importance 
of considering the whole experimental set-up including the two analyzer settings a,b: see e.g. footnote 
7.) 
The main arguments in favor of the Standard Position are, it seems to us, the following. First, it 
saves locality in Bell’s sense. And of course, it is part of the Copenhagen interpretation which has 
proven itself countless times since its conception. Here one may however observe that the 
Copenhagen interpretation contains theses that have mainly a physical content (such as Born’s rule) 
which indeed are admirably confirmed by experiment, but also metaphysical theses – and rejecting 
HVs obviously belongs to these extra-physical hypotheses. Rejecting any yet to discover HVs reminds 
of a slogan as “we talk about what we can measure or calculate; the rest does not exist” – a slogan 
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which summarizes an axiom of the positivist philosophy, by which Bohr may well have been 
influenced [27, 2]. In sum, in a sense position S1 espouses well the daily practice of mainstream 
physics; in a sense it seems to make extra-physical commitments that are minimal. However, it is not 
part of physics in the strict sense. Proponents of other positions may very well continue to inquire 
about the perfect correlations of the EPR/Bell experiment. Probability theory does not prohibit that 
probabilities (which these correlations are) are considered as resulting from underlying causal 
mechanisms. The examples of physical systems in which probabilistic behaviour can be retraced to 
deterministic laws, are countless. And in a different sense, S1 and the Copenhagen interpretation 
become quite spectacular, and metaphysically heavily loaded. Indeed, S1 can be restated as follows: 
when, at the moment of measurement of a quantum property  like spin (in the Bell experiment) one 
obtains a certain value (+1 or -1), this value is the result of absolute hazard, in the sense that it will 
never be possible, not even in principle, to explain this result. No theory can ever be constructed going 
beyond the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics (only P() exists). In other words: we are in 
the presence of events that have no cause; the microscopic world is full of such ‘indeterministic’ 
events; and quantum mechanics is the ‘final’ theory for such events (in the sense stated). (Note that 
what S1 claims for the properties measured in a Bell experiment, the Copenhagen interpretation 
claims for all quantum properties, except for those that are in an eigenstate of the measured property.)   
S2. The Non-Standard Solution (‘nonlocality’ in Bell’s strong sense). The non-standard 
approach is to conclude from (B1) that locality (in Bell’s sense) is violated in nature, i.e. that 
superluminal influences (forces) exist. Needless to say, this is a speculative, unorthodox solution since 
it violates relativity theory. However, it is possible in principle ([2], [8] p. 171). A well-known 
example of a non-local HVT is Bohm’s theory [28]. Note that it seems that of all the solutions 
reviewed here S2 and S4 below are the only ones that could in principle be proven. Also, the 
superluminal force field needed for S2 could be ultraweak and dynamically enhanced by nonlinear 
dynamics, as shown in [29]. An ultraweak force field may have, till date, escaped from detection.  
It will be no surprise that for many people both S1 and S2 remain unsatisfactory, for the 
reasons stated. In the next Sections we will investigate two further positions, which aim at avoiding 
the ‘unpleasant’ features of S1 and S2.  
 
4. First Neglected Solution: Superdeterminism (S3). 
            That ‘total determinism’ or ‘superdeterminism’ (S3) offers a solution to the Bell impasse has 
been observed by a few physicists, soon after [1], starting by Bell himself [2, 14]. Besides in 
interesting analyses by authors as Brans [7], Peres [8], ‘tHooft [9], Khrennikov [10] and recently Hall 
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[6,11], S3 has until now been considered a completely implausible solution. However, the debate may 
be unduly unbalanced, as we will argue now. Whereas S1 and S2 accept Bell’s original no-go theorem 
(B1), total determinism (S3) questions its derivation; or rather, starts from the more precise analysis 
(C1-C3), and recognizes that MI (C3) is an essential assumption of any derivation of the BI.  
In short, total determinism assumes 1) that any event, property or variable is determined in the 
sense (1), including the choices ‘a’ and ‘b’ of the analyzer settings in a Bell experiment; and 2) that 
there is, when going back in time, a contraction of the ‘causal tree’ (the collection of all events) to a 
small space-time region – which is nothing more than the hypothesis of the Big-Bang. If this view is 
correct, it immediately follows that 1 and 2 must be determined by some cause , but also that a, b 
and  should have common causes (since the ‘world cone’ converges to say a point).  Now, as we saw 
in Section 2, in that case  may stochastically depend on (a,b) and MI in (3) does not necessarily hold, 
even in a fully local world. This point has first been made by Shimony et al. [14], it seems. If MI (C3) 
does not hold, Bell’s no-go theorem cannot be derived, i.e. there may be local HVTs reproducing the 
quantum statistics.  
Thus, solution S3 considers the world as ‘superdeterministic’, in that even our choices of 
parameter settings are determined and in principle linked to virtually all other physical properties 
through a retracting world cone. Because this position seems in contradiction with a classic 
conception of ‘free will’ [15], Bell termed S3 a ‘mind-boggling’ or ‘conspiratorial’ option [2]; David 
Mermin speaks of ‘the most paranoid of conspiracy theories’ [19]. These negative verdicts seem to 
have had a lasting influence on the community of quantum physicists and philosophers. But since 
these arguments are not strictly part of physics, but of philosophy, it seems inappropriate to disconnect 
the discussion from the most relevant philosophical theories on the matter (in the remainder of this 
Section and in the Appendix we try to provide at least a mini-introduction, be it extremely 
condensed). In particular, it deserves to be emphasized that above verdicts, presented as patently 
commonsensical, neglect a worldview that is cogent, well-documented and widespread
5
 outside the 
quantum community. Determinism is at the heart of philosophical debate since millennia. One of the 
philosophers who in our personal opinion defended determinism best is Spinoza, who put it at the 
basis of his system [30-31]. According to Spinoza (and a very considerable part of all philosophers 
                                                          
5
 Total determinism seems to be a popular philosophy. For what it is worth, here is the result of a little survey we did, one 
among about 20 physicists, experts of the foundations of quantum mechanics, one among about 20 philosophy students. In 
both cases, about 40% of participants said to be in favour of determinism, 60% in favour of indeterminism. (In a third 
group (30 p.), after a defense of determinism, the ratio was rather inversed.) These surveys were casual and have of course 
no pretension. 
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having studied the question) determinism is not antagonistic to free will, just to a simple conception of 
it.    
Let us go once more over the arguments. On the one hand it is just normal that Bell [1] started 
from (implicitly) assuming measurement independence, for at least two reasons. First, it seems that 
the practice of physics is only possible because separated subsystems can be described by physical 
parameters (such as , a, b) that belong only to particular subsystems, and not to all systems; at any 
rate, ‘systemic’ descriptions are customary in physics, if not the only possible ones. More importantly, 
in the Bell experiment the analyzer positions a and b can be chosen and set by an experimenter. How 
then could they be determined by other variables - variables that moreover would also fix properties of 
the particle pairs ? That seems too much of a violation of free will - at least, such is the dominant 
position in the Bell literature. However, from another point of view, assuming MI is not innocent - 
actually, it arguably corresponds to an uneconomic worldview. Indeed, recall that one of the initial 
motivations of Bell, just as of Einstein, was to investigate whether quantum mechanics could be made 
deterministic, as classical theories. Now start, just as Bell, from the hypothesis that certain quantum 
properties , intervening in the Bell experiment, are deterministic (determined, caused, by yet hidden 
variables). If one wants to reason within the simplest, most economic model, then one should also 
assume that all other physical properties are determined (a worldview with both deterministic and 
indeterministic quantities needs two categories). Still within this most simple worldview or ontology, 
human beings are also determined physical beings: their actions can be described – in principle, not in 
practice – by deterministic properties. In short: all events (or systems), whether of animate or 
inanimate origin, are caused by previous events; which are caused in turn by still earlier events, etc.. 
Now, if one takes the Big Bang theory into account, it would appear that the idea of a universal causal 
‘branching’ or ‘network’ between events, originating at the Big Bang and connecting (almost) 
‘anything to anything’, is a quite natural conclusion. In sum, measurement independence appears to be 
in contradiction with a simple ontology, the mentioned ‘total’ or ‘superdeterminism’ (actually, 
determinism would suffice as a term). As is well-known, free will and probabilities are explained in 
this model as ‘emerging’ due to our unavoidable lack of knowledge of all causal factors. On this view 
free will is a perception, imparted by our obvious feeling to be free – a feeling that surely is 
immensely functional but still might be an illusion.             
 So, what seems at first glance, from our daily point of view of free agents, a paranoid 
conspiracy theory, becomes from another point of view a quite reasonable hypothesis. As recalled in 
the Appendix, this point of view has been advocated since centuries, and probably millennia, by 
countless scholars. In this context, it seems that terming S3 ‘conspiratorial’ is rash. Authors who call 
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S3 ‘conspiratorial’ do so because they look at this position from following angle: an operator (or an 
automat) doing the Bell experiment would be determined to set, in function of each particle pair, the 
polarizers in just these positions so as to make the result coincide with the quantum prediction. But 
this seems an anthropocentric point of view. Determinism basically only says that every event happens 
according to deterministic laws – full stop. Then, if we do an experiment and obtain a result obeying 
quantum laws these events all must be determined and linked (see above); in other words quantum 
mechanics is an effective theory (as many others) having at least in principle a subjacent explanation. 
This seems a direct consequence of logic and the above simple hypotheses, not of conspiracy
6
. As so 
often, conspiracy is in the eye of the beholder. All depends from which assumptions one starts.  
 In conclusion, a third position (S3) w.r.t. Bell’s theorem is conceivable, namely, in short, the 
assumption of total determinism, implying a (local) violation of measurement independence (C3). 
This position saves locality, does not violate any known physical law, and leaves open the possibility 
to complete quantum mechanics in the EPR/Bell sense, as in Eq. (1) or (5). It points however to a very 
different kind of non-locality, namely a universal connectedness of virtually all systems (including 
human beings), due to a receding world cone. Of course, if S3 would be true, the truly mind-boggling 
thing would be that quantum mechanics and Bell’s theorem allow us to discover this ancient and 
universal link between virtually all objects; and to corroborate a millennia old philosophy. We believe 
that the main argument in favor of superdeterminism is that it corresponds to the simplest worldview, 
based on the fewest concepts (and should one not adopt the simplest theory agreeing with the facts ?). 
Its main drawback is that it may be difficult to directly transpose it in a physical theory. (At least this 
is Bell’s position, see his last article in [14]. The reason invoked is that theories that describe both our 
choices and Bell experiments by explicitly exhibiting common parameters are doubtlessly impossible. 
Other people are not impressed [9].)  
We believe however that a solution exists (S4 below) that is essentially physical, i.e. that may 
be more easily backed-up by a new physical theory.  
  
                                                          
6
 A well-known theory on conspiracy theories [32] proposes following ground for people believing in conspiracy. In short: 
extraordinary effects call for extraordinary causes. In the face of events or ‘coincidences’ that are perceived as formidable, 
people would have a tendency to look for formidable explanations: a conspiracy by higher powers (or simply the 
powerful). Now, exactly this theory [32] might apply to people calling S3 a ‘conspiracy theory’ (!): they perceive S3 as too 
formidable to be true, and believe that only higher powers – a conspiracy – can explain what S3 proposes. In this context, 
see also Spinoza [30], who denounced fallacious reasoning of a quite similar type. He analyzed in particular the case of his 
contemporary fellows, who, in view of the perfection of the world and the quasi-infinite potential of harmonious 
interaction it offers, concluded that it surely must have been made for them by a higher power. But according to Spinoza’s 
determinism, and modern biology, nature and mankind evolved in a lawful way so as to necessarily be in some kind of 
harmony – no divine plan is needed. In sum: anthropocentric reasoning is widespread and often wrong.  
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5. Second Neglected Solution: Supercorrelation (S4). 
5.1. Measurement dependence through past interaction (S4a). 
            For convenience we will collect two potential solutions under the term ‘supercorrelation’: it 
will be seen they both invoke stronger (or other) correlations between the system variables 1, 2, , 
a, b than the other positions do. More precisely, we propose here solutions that refute MI in (C3) but 
not through superdeterminism; and OI in (C5). 
 Needless to say, abstract reflection on HVTs is perilous – we know by definition almost 
nothing about them, and it is difficult not be guided by some preconceptions; many people will have 
very different ideas about what they may look like. In the present Section I am guided by some early 
attempts to construct realistic HVTs for (certain aspects of) quantum mechanics, in which the HVs are 
(values of) fields. (As far as I know these are at present the most promising candidates.) For instance, 
in [33-35] the essential HV is a stochastic zero-point field that imparts Brownian motion to quantum 
particles, from which on average the standard quantum statistics would emerge. Ref. [34] mentions, as 
one of its sources of inspiration, recent and spectacular experiments by Couder et al. [36], in which 
quantum behavior (e.g. double slit interference) is reproduced by macroscopic particles, namely oil 
droplets. The latter are excited by an external field (the vibration of an oil bed) imparting Brownian 
motion to the droplets. There seems to be a common denominator in these theories [33-35] and 
experiments [36], a kind of ‘contextuality’, namely the fact that the precise shape of the (zero-point) 
field ( for us) depends on the ‘context’, i.e. the boundary conditions of the whole experimental set-up 
including the parameters of all, even remote, detectors. For instance, the experiments [36] 
impressively show that the wave field guiding a particular oil droplet through slit 1 is determined by 
the geometry of both slits; a feature also present in the HVT for the quantum version of double slit 
interference of Ref. [34]. If a similar contextual -field would exist in the Bell experiment, then MI in 
(3) would not be satisfied in general – the field  may well depend on (a,b) – at least if the detector 
settings are static. Note that this violation of MI (at the moment of measurement) would come about 
not through common causes between  and (a,b), i.e. through superdeterminism, but through an earlier 
interaction between the field  and the analyzers (a and b). Let us emphasize that the experiments of 
Couder et al. show that one would be ill-advised to consider such a contextuality as far-fetched: it has 
now been proven to exist even in macroscopic systems, and to lead to quantum-like behavior 
(including tunneling and quantization of angular momentum) [36].  
What if in a Bell experiment a spacelike separation between the left and right measurement 
events is imposed, as is the case in the most sophisticated experiments [13, 25] ? Then MI seems 
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harder to overcome, but not as untouchable as often believed. First of all, note that these experiments 
[13, 25] do not really use changing analyzer directions (e.g. rotating analyzers), as Bell repeatedly 
advocated, starting in his first paper [1]. They achieve spacelike separation between measurement 
events by using random switches and sufficiently retarding the choice between two static analyzer 
directions (a and a’ on the left, b and b’ on the right). But then it seems conceivable, within the kind of 
contextual theories just mentioned, that a hidden field accompanying or describing the particles 
exhibits four modes each depending on a left and right analyzer direction, so labeled by (a,b), (a’,b), 
(a, b’) and (a’, b’); and that when the random switches of the experiment chose e.g. (a,b) they select 
the -mode depending on (a,b) (similarly for the 3 other modes) – a resonance phenomenon. In other 
words, it seems that in this experiment the -field may depend on (a,b), i.e. that MI in (3) may be 
violated, notwithstanding the spacelike separation. As we will see further this argument applies a 
fortiori to OI. On the above view, it is essential that experiments be done with one polarizer on both 
sides, each changing its polarization direction rapidly enough (ideally by rotation). This may however 
be difficult to realize.  
 Before looking at a model system, I believe it is important to emphasize that ‘measurement 
dependence (through past interactions)’ (or ‘contextuality’) is fully compatible with a precise 
application of probability theory. As is well known, the interpretation of probability is a surprisingly 
subtle topic debated among all fathers of probability theory, such as Laplace, Kolmogorov, von Mises 
etc., and countless scholars since [10]. In recent studies, following von Mises, it has been stressed that 
1) probabilities belong to experiments and not to objects or events per se, and 2) that any probability 
depends at least in principle on the ‘context’ including all detector settings of the probabilistic 
experiment [10, 37]. (This is a position that Bohr held regarding quantum systems, but that arguably 
holds also for classical probabilistic systems [37]). According to this analysis, then,  in (2) and (7) 
should in principle be considered as |a,b). This seems the essential idea of several papers 
criticizing Bell’s theorem (see e.g. [10, 38-39] and references therein)7. In the present paper we focus 
on physical arguments on how such a measurement dependence can come about.   
 Indeed, it seems essential to demonstrate the above ideas in existing physical systems. 
Theoretical work on the justification or rejection of MI, OI and PI has until now been restricted to 
mathematical considerations and information-theoretic toy models (for a recent review, see [6]). As 
far as we know no realistic physical systems have been investigated. The initial question of this 
Section was: could there be a local HVT for the Bell experiment that violates MI but that does not 
                                                          
7
 It seems noteworthy that this is an argument that even Bohr might have liked: he often stressed that a quantum system 
includes the whole measurement equipment, due to the complementary nature of such arrangements. 
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invoke common causal factors for , a, b, so that doesn’t rely on superdeterminism ? Although we 
cannot provide a full-blown (and not ad-hoc) HVT, we can exhibit a physical system, well-known 
from classical statistical mechanics, that violates the BI, that is local, and in which MI is violated 
without superdeterminism, i.e. even if we assume free will in the usual sense. That local (and 
classical) HV systems can strongly violate the BI, is a surprise in itself.  
 We are looking for model systems that are strongly correlated, since for those it is a priori 
clear that MI, OI and PI (Eq. (3), (8-9)) may not necessarily hold. We want to perform a Bell-type 
correlation experiment on such a system and verify whether the BI holds. One of the most studied 
models in statistical mechanics is the Ising model (originally proposed to investigate ferromagnetic 
phase transitions in low-dimensional electron systems [40-41]). Its Hamiltonian is: 
                                    H() = – i,j Jij.i.j – i hi.i.                                                 (12) 
Here the Jij represent the interaction between spin i (i = ±1) and spin j and are responsible for 
‘cooperative’ behaviour and long-range correlations (positive Jij induce lowering of the energy if the 
spins are aligned). Jij ranges over first neighbours of N particles (electrons, ions, …) sitting on a D-
dimensional lattice. The hi are local magnetic fields and  is the N-spin configuration {1, 2,…, N}, 
occurring according to the usual Boltzmann distribution. Note that this is really a classical system (in 
quantum versions of (12) the i are Pauli matrices, see (17)) but that in some anisotropic magnetic 
materials, when only one spin direction (z) matters, (12) coincides with the quantum description. Also 
note that the ‘interaction’ between the spins is of course not a direct spin-spin interaction; the first 
term in (12) arises through a Coulomb potential combined with the Pauli exclusion principle
8
. Finally, 
the i do not even need to be spins (they can represent atomic occupation in a crystal or a lattice gas, 
deviation from equilibrium position in a network of springs, etc.): the Ising Hamiltonian is ubiquitous 
in physics. 
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Fig. 1. 10 spins on a square lattice.  
Each node contains a spin i (i = a,b,1,…,8), which can be up or down. 
                                                          
8
 The quantum treatment shows that the Jij correspond to the exchange integrals   *ab.V.ba.d
3
x1.d
3
x2, with V the 
Coulomb potential and ab(x1,x2) = a(x1).b(x2) (where a(b)(x1(2)) are the single electron eigenfunctions located at x1 and 
x2 respectively)  ([41] Chap. 7).    
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Let us consider a square lattice (Fig. 1) of N = 10 spins (of electrons, ions,…) interacting with first 
neighbours only. At given temperature 1/ a configuration  = {a, b, 1,…, 8} occurs with the 
Boltzmann probability (or configuration probability) P() given by: 
                P()  =  e-H() / Z, with  = 1/kT  and  Z =  e
-H()
, the partition function.             (13) 
It is then well-known and straightforward to calculate that this system shows full pairwise correlation 
in the sense that 
                     P(i=, j=)  ≠  P(i=).P(j=)     for all i,j ≤  N = 10   and ,  = ±1.                          (14)                  
As an example, P(i=, j=) is calculated as P() where the sum runs over the 2
8
 10-spin 
configurations  in which i= and j=. Since each term in the sum involves the energy H() 
given by (12) the calculation is easily done by numerical simulation. Similarly, in the following any 
probability P() with  an m-spin configuration (m≤10) is calculated by: 
                                                                )(P  =  
m
P
102
)(
)(

 ,                                                                (15)     
where the sum runs over the 2
10-m
 10-spin configurations  that ‘contain’ .   
We are interested in producing an analog of the Bell experiment in which quantum 
probabilities as P(1,2|a,b) are completed or explained by additional variables , by summing over 
probabilities as in (5) – remember that is what we ask of a stochastic HVT9. Consider then an 
ensemble of 10-spin lattices as in Fig. 1, all at the same temperature, and measure for each lattice the 
value (±1) of 1, a, 2, b (here a and b mimic the analyzer variables a and b of the Bell 
experiment; 3, 4,…, 8 can be considered hidden variables)
10
. Measurement on a large ensemble 
allows to determine the joint probabilities P(1=, 2=│a,b) (, = ±1); these probabilities can be 
determined for any of the 4 possible couples (a,b) ≡ (a,b) = (±1,±1) by postselecting 4 
subsensembles from the total run – exactly as in the real Bell experiments. With these probabilities the 
average product M(a,b) = < 1.2>a,b for the 4 couples (a,b) can then be determined by using Eq. (6). 
And finally, putting a≡b≡+1 and a’≡b’≡ –1, the quantity XBI in (4) can be experimentally determined 
(and calculated) for each parameter set (Jij, hi) (we always take = 1, a common value [40]).  
                                                          
9
 Also, it plays no role whether these  are classical or quantum-like, a case we will investigate elsewhere [42], as 
explicitly mentioned by Bell (see [2]). 
10
 If one wants to push the analogy with the Bell experiment further, suppose that Alice measures 1 and a, and Bob 2 
and b. 
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Note that this system is local in any usual sense [1, 12]. It is local in Bell’s sense [1] because 
there is no interaction (and a fortiori no superluminal interaction) between the ‘left’ and ‘right’ sides 
of the lattice, i.e. between (1,a) and (2,b). Indeed, the interactions Jij range only over first 
neighbors (Jij is taken = 0 otherwise). Importantly, it is also local in the sense that the Clauser-Horne 
factorability condition (11) is satisfied, with = (3,4,…,8) or any subset thereof, as is easily 
calculated by using (15). Recall that (11) serves as the usual definition of locality in stochastic 
systems.  Further, it is easy to calculate that in a lattice in which there is an interaction Jij ≠ 0 between 
some ‘left’ or ‘right’ spins (e.g. between 1 and b), also the locality condition (11) fails to hold [42]. 
It is then surprising, to some point, that in this Bell-type experiment on a local (and classical) 
system the BI (4) can be strongly violated. Violation occurs for wide ranges of system parameters (hi, 
Jij) (as also for a variety of other 1D and 2D geometries we investigated). Indeed, by numerical 
simulation one finds e.g. for the values hi=1 (all i), and Jij=1.4 (first neighbours), that XBI = 2.24 > 2 
(the value 2.24 is at least a local maximum). If one allows the magnetic fields hi to vary over the sites 
(keeping left-right symmetry), the BI can be violated to a much higher degree. For instance, for 
h1=h2=h6=h8= 1.9, h3=h4=h5=ha=hb= 0.4, Jij = 2.0 (these are realistic values [40]), XBI = 2.883, which 
can be compared to 2√2 ≈ 2.83, the value for the singlet state. 
If the BI is violated in a probabilistic HV system, necessarily at least one of the conditions MI, 
OI, and PI must be violated. Since the factorability (11) holds, OI and PI hold (as can also be 
calculated independently); therefore the only remaining ‘resource’ for violation of the BI is 
measurement dependence. By applying again (15), one indeed immediately finds that 
                           P(|a,b)  ≠  P(|a’,b’)   for any  and any (a,b) ≠ (a’,b’)                              (16) 
where  ≡ (3,4,…8) or any subset thereof (i = ±1). So MI in Eq. (3) does not hold, as is not 
really a surprise in this highly correlated system satisfying Eq. (14). 
 Thus this system indeed offers an example of measurement dependence without 
superdeterminism (without common causes between a, b, ); so, if one prefers, compatible with a 
usual conception of free will. If this is not clear already, it can be proven as follows. In the above 
Gedankenexperiment Alice and Bob extract the 4 correlation functions M(a,b) needed to determine 
XBI from one total run. But if one explicitly assumes that they can control the value of a and b, so 
set these spins to +1 or -1 according to their free choice, and that they perform 4 consecutive 
experiments to determine the M(a,b), then it is clear that these 4 correlation functions are identical to 
the ones of the first experiment (for who is not convinced, both cases can of course be explicitly 
calculated). Ergo, also in this second experiment the BI will be violated. In sum, this proves that 
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correlation of  with (a,b) through local interaction (see (16)) can arise also without assuming 
superdeterminism. This is important, since as we stated in Section 2, according to the accepted view 
[14-15, 6] violation of MI is dismissed by observing that it would be a superdeterministic fact, 
violating free will. This result shows once more that the conditions of probabilistic independence (MI, 
OI, PI) that are the premises of the BI, should be considered with extreme caution. Of course our 
model system seems to best apply to a Bell experiment with static analyzers; one may still wonder 
whether in an experiment with varying analyzer settings MI could be violated. But as we argued in the 
beginning of this Section, we conjecture that the existing experiments [13, 25] do not exclude that MI 
is violated: a resonance phenomenon may create measurement dependence through the interaction of 
‘something’ (, say a field) with both analyzers.  
In sum, according to this solution (S4a), local correlations at the moment of measurement are a 
remnant of past correlations persisting in time. Correlations that persist in time happen all the time. 
For briefness one could term this position ‘(local) measurement dependence through past 
interactions’, a variant of what we termed supercorrelation.  
 
5.2. Outcome dependence (S4b). 
Let us continue to focus on the stochastic variant of Bell’s theorem. Then, as always starting 
from the premises (C3-C6), the next potential solution would be based on refuting outcome 
independence (C5); an option that would be interesting if it is compatible with Einstein locality. Note 
that also parameter independence (C6) could be questioned; but it is generally believed that rejecting 
PI amounts to a strong nonlocal effect (‘non-local signaling’) [4-6]. Let us now argue that OI could be 
violated in local physical systems. First, locality is usually supposed to imply the factorability 
condition (11) and OI; but recall that it has never been proven that Bell’s and Einstein’s locality [1] 
necessarily imply OI. Are there systems that are local in Bell’s sense [1] (see footnote 1) but violate 
OI ? Closer inspection of the definitions of MI, OI and PI in (3), (8) and (9) shows that there is a 
relevant difference between MI and PI on the one hand, and OI on the other. As we saw in detail 
above, there is some justification in accepting MI and PI in experiments with spacelike separation (but 
see our counterarguments above). Both MI and PI involve conditional probabilities in which one of 
the conditioning parameters (a or b) is supposed to be irrelevant because it is chosen in a space-like 
separated part of the experiment. However, OI invokes a very different kind of conditional 
independence: here it is 1 that is supposed to be irrelevant for 2 or v.v. (given ,a,b). But then the 
argument justifying MI and PI is not helpful for OI: correlation between 1 and 2 may very well be 
independent of the spacelike separation between the choices of a and b. Next, in the case of the singlet 
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state of the Bell experiment, correlation between 1 and 2 (given ,a,b) is to be expected a fortiori, 
since 1 and 2 are governed by a conservation law. Such correlation may well exist and persist over 
time; and the time of choice of a,b seems to have nothing to do with it. In sum, it is somewhat 
mysterious why OI is so generally believed to necessarily hold in local systems. Maybe because one 
believes that such correlations would get wiped out; but we don’t know much about sub-quantum 
reality; and countless correlations in nature do persist almost indefinitely. 
Needless to say, there is still a long way to go from this remark to the construction of a full-
blown local HVT that reproduces the quantum correlations (and e.g. violates OI). However it seems 
again possible to corroborate above arguments by a Bell-type Gedankenexperiment on a known 
physical system. Indeed, consider again a spin lattice as in Fig. 1 (containing N≥ 10 lattice points), but 
this time described by the ‘quantum Ising’ Hamiltonian [43]: 
                                             H  =  – J ij ˆ z,iˆ z,j  –  h.J iˆ x,i.                                                  (17) 
This Hamiltonian describes other magnetic materials than those described by (12) [43]. Here the ˆ z 
and ˆ x are Pauli spin matrices; the first sum runs over all nearest neighbour pairs; and h is a 
dimensionless coupling constant. As we will show elsewhere [42], performing on this system the Bell-
type correlation experiment described in Section 5.1, one finds that the BI can be violated under very 
broad conditions. (The HV are here the eigenvalues of ˆ z on the sites other than 1,2,a,b [42].) One 
also finds that none of the conditions OI, MI and PI holds here, even if this system is local in Bell’s 
original sense [1], as any known physical system is (the interactions J are truncated after first 
neighbours and there is obviously no superluminal interaction between parts). Note that the system 
does not even have a symmetry between 1 and 2; in which case violation of OI is expected a 
fortiori. 
 Based on above arguments, we conjecture that another solution to Bell’s theorem exists, 
namely ‘local outcome dependence’ (S4b), which we classified as a form of supercorrelation. 
Realistic local HVTs should exhibit a dynamical mechanism, e.g. mediated by a field (possibly along 
the lines of [33-35]), that creates such a supercorrelation and reproduces the quantum correlations.  
 
5.3. Supercorrelation as an intermediate position between Bohr’s and Einstein’s. 
Let us end this Section with a brief remark, linking in a way the four positions S1-S4. From 
large parts of what we said above, it is clear that both superdeterminism and supercorrelation point to 
a causal ‘connectedness’ between particles (objects) and their (space-time) environment. 
Superdeterminism includes ‘everything’ in the environment, supercorrelation only typical 
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experimental arrangements. (That is why the latter seems the more physical solution.) As we already 
noted in Sections 3 and 5.1, this reminds us of the well-known ‘contextuality’ or ‘holism’ of the 
Copenhagen interpretation and of Bohm’s theory; so there is a relevant link between the four 
positions. Interestingly, this connection between S1-S4 seems corroborated by what Einstein [44] 
maintained about the EPR paradox, long after its publication. Here is what the great man said (quoted 
by Bell in [2]):  
“If one asks what, irrespective of quantum mechanics, is characteristic of the world of ideas of 
physics, one is first of all struck by the following: the concepts of physics relate to a real outside 
world. […] It is further characteristic of these physical objects that they are thought of as arranged in a 
space-time continuum. An essential aspect of this arrangement of things in physics is that they lay 
claim, at a certain time, to an existence independent of one another, provided these objects are situated 
in different parts of space. The following idea characterizes the relative independence of objects far 
apart in space (A and B): external influence on A has no direct influence on B. […]”  
“There seems to me no doubt that those physicists who regard the descriptive methods of 
quantum mechanics as definitive in principle would react to this line of thought in the following way: 
they would drop the requirement […] for the independent existence of the physical reality present in 
different parts of space; they would be justified in pointing out that the quantum theory nowhere 
makes explicit use of this requirement. I admit this, but would point out: when I consider the physical 
phenomena known to me, and especially those which are being so successfully encompassed by 
quantum mechanics, I still cannot find any fact anywhere which would make it appear likely that 
[that] requirement will have to be abandoned. I am therefore inclined to believe that the description of 
quantum mechanics […] has to be regarded as an incomplete and indirect description of reality, to be 
replaced at some later date by a more complete and direct one.” 
In a sense, then, supercorrelation is a position intermediate between Einstein’s and Bohr’s (or 
at least the position that Einstein attributes to faithful fans of the Copenhagen interpretation): it 
assumes that there indeed may be an interdependence between physical realities in far apart places; at 
the same time it aims at explaining this interdependence in a ‘realist’s’ way à la Einstein. 
In sum, the four interpretations S1-S4 have a striking element in common (they all deal with 
the connectedness of things); but they favor very different physical theories and very different 
philosophies to explain this connectedness. 
 
21 
 
6. Conclusion. 
We reviewed here some of the admissible interpretations of Bell’s theorem, paying attention to 
some lesser-known aspects. The most precise starting point to look for solutions to Bell’s theorem are 
the premises (C1-C3) and (C3-C6) which are the minimal assumptions to derive the BI, in 
respectively a deterministic and stochastic setting [4-6]. Besides the orthodox interpretation 
(indeterminism) and a well-known non-standard solution (nonlocality, i.e. the existence of nonlocal 
influences in Bell’s strong sense), we investigated two rather neglected solutions, termed here 
‘superdeterminism’ and ‘supercorrelation’. Superdeterminism rejects MI ‘through common causes 
between  and (a, b)’; supercorrelation rejects OI or MI ‘through past interaction’. All these solutions 
have physical and metaphysical components; they all have something mind-boggling about them. 
Superdeterminism is often considered implausible by the community of quantum physicists and 
philosophers [2, 14-15, 19], but strictly on the basis of extra-physical arguments linked to ‘free will’ 
or conspiracy. These criticisms can be questioned simply because they are metaphysical. It was argued 
that superdeterminism is a solution that does not violate any known physical law, that is based on the 
simplest ontology, and that has therefore a strong philosophical appeal. It was also shown that 
supercorrelation has the additional advantage that it is more easily backed-up by physical arguments.  
Indeed, we emphasized the importance of investigating the conditions MI, OI and PI in 
realistic physical systems, since it appears extremely difficult to assess their validity by logic or 
mathematics alone. It was shown that in a correlation experiment on certain spin lattices the Bell 
inequality can be strongly violated; yet these systems are local according to usual definitions [1,12]. 
This surprise was explained by the fact that these systems violate MI. They do so even if one assumes 
free will; one almost always supposes that MI must hold because of free will [14-15]. Consequently 
we argued that violation of MI and OI through local interaction cannot be excluded on the basis of 
existing Bell experiments, not even those with a spacelike separation between the left and right 
measurement events [13, 25]. Experiments with effectively changing (rotating) analyzer directions 
might impose MI, and would therefore be of interest. Because of the symmetry that links 1 and 2 in 
a singlet state, OI seems to be even less compelling than MI.  
In conclusion, the Ising lattices, the early HVTs for double-slit interference we mentioned [33-
35], and the remarkable experiments by Couder et al. [36] all have something in common, namely a 
strong correlation between all system variables, presumably even a full pairwise correlation as in the 
Ising lattices (see Eq. (14)). Since in such strongly correlated systems the BI may be violated, we hope 
that other such systems will be investigated, in particular those with a temporal dynamics and with a 
symmetry between the two particles.  
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The ultimate goal of this program would be to devise a realistic HVT for the singlet state, and 
beyond. Until the day such a genuine HVT explaining quantum mechanics - and predicting something 
new - will be confirmed by experiments, the different interpretations of Bell’s theorem are likely to 
remain with us. In the meanwhile it seems best to take indeterminism (S1) not for more than what it is, 
namely one of several possible hypotheses – not an axiom of a physics theory. Other interpretations 
just pursue a usual scientific program, namely to explain striking probabilistic behavior, here the EPR-
Bell correlations. 
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Appendix. Determinism in the history of philosophy; Spinoza’s system. 
 In particular concerning the issue of determinism discussed in Section 4, there is a strong 
interrelation between physics and philosophy. Rejecting (total) determinism (S3) amounts, in a sense, 
to a dramatic discontinuity in the history of western thought (which is of course not a proof of 
determinism). The following is a highly condensed and selective introduction to the history of this 
position, an introduction inevitably biased by personal preference.  
Actually, consulting general encyclopedia of philosophy would suffice to see that determinism 
and free will belong to the most hotly debated topics of philosophy. Virtually all well-known 
philosophers – and countless scholars from other fields - have written about the topic [21, 45]. The 
debate is millennia old: among the first known western philosophers who defended determinism were 
Leucippus and his pupil Democritus (5
th
 cent. BC), who stated that everything happens out of 
necessity, not chance. Democritus, often called the ‘Father of Science’, is most famous for having 
elaborated a detailed and incredibly modern-looking atomic theory. It is, in this context, a fascinating 
question to inquire on what basis Democritus could conjecture so precociously the existence of 
ultimate and indivisible constituents of matter, governed by laws. According to Sextus Empiricus he 
did so on the basis of empirical observations, such as the fact that certain substances dissolve in water 
in constant ratios, that certain physical and biological components degrade but also regenerate, etc.; 
but also of theoretical principles - namely the principle of determinism (everything has a cause) and 
the related idea of ‘nihil ex nihilo’ (nothing comes from nothing). The latter idea has been retraced to 
Parmenides (6
th
 cent. BC), but might be much older, since it was generally accepted in Greek 
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antiquity. It is not exaggerated to say, we believe, that these ideas are among the very few founding 
postulates of science and philosophy. 
Since the ancient Greeks, some of the philosophers who defended determinism (understood: 
total determinism) were Avicenna, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Kant, Schopenhauer, Laplace, Russell, 
Einstein, S. Hawking - to name a few. Needless to say, the views of these philosophers on 
determinism may differ in certain respects; but the key ingredient clearly remains. As already 
mentioned, the majority of philosophers who believed in determinism also believed in the absence of 
free will in the usual sense (but not all of them, see [45]). Aristotle was one of the early advocates of 
indeterminism (the action of irreducible chance or randomness). Leibniz’ name is forever linked to his 
celebrated ‘principle of sufficient reason’, stipulating that everything must have a reason. Kant 
famously elected the thesis that all events have a cause one of his ‘synthetic a priori principles’.  
In the above list we believe Baruch Spinoza (1632 – 1677) deserves a special mention. We 
find Spinoza’s defense of determinism particularly attractive and powerful, since he puts determinism 
at the very basis of a systematic theory of the world and of human action [30-31]. (Needless to say, 
strong philosophical theses can in general not be proven, but they can acquire cogency if they are part 
of full-blown theories that explain things; obviously, the more the theory explains, the more 
convincing the founding premises are.) In Spinoza’s principal work, the Ethics, constructed as a 
deductive system based on axioms, determinism is omnipresent from the start [30-31]. Moreover, it is 
simple and radical. One typical example is Spinoza’s Proposition 29 of the Ethics, Part 1: “Nothing is 
fortuitous in Nature; everything is determined by the necessity of Nature to exist and produce effects 
in a given manner.” In other places Spinoza illustrates this thesis by stating that every individual 
action of any human being is as determined, as necessary to happen, as it is necessary that the sum of 
the angles of a triangle is 180°. In sum, within Spinoza’s philosophy human free will is an illusion, or 
rather, should be redefined (which however does not bring Spinoza to fatalism, but to a wonderful 
pro-active ethical theory). 
Even this very selective review will illustrate that ‘measurement independence’, a necessary 
assumption of all Bell theorems, cannot be considered as ‘obvious’, as is so often done. In many well-
known, popular, and solid ontologies, such as Spinoza’s, it does not hold. As already said, in one 
sense the indeterminism of S1 represents a formidable discontinuity in the history of science. S1 
implies that a property  acquires during measurement a certain value (+1 or -1) based on no ‘reason’ 
(cause) whatsoever; and that no theory ever will be able to provide such a reason (i.e. new physical 
parameters of which  will appear to be a function, or that determine the probability P()). But the 
history of scientific discovery is the history of finding explanations of phenomena that are only 
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random at first sight. S1 says: we can stop our search for explanations here, forever. And yet, S1 may 
be the right interpretation. A good dose of agnosticism seems in place. 
As a last remark, notice that for a true determinist also supercorrelation (S4) can be considered 
compatible with the principle of determinism, the hypothesis that everything has a cause. Indeed, 
suppose that a theory would exist agreeing with supercorrelation. If that theory would predict some 
probabilities then these may of course be supposed to result from hidden causes not part of the theory. 
Probability theory does not prohibit such an assumption. Indeed, one of its fathers, Laplace, believed 
that any probability is only a tool we need because of our ignorance of hidden causes. And the 
examples in physics in which probabilistic behavior can very well be retraced to deterministic laws, 
are countless. 
Thus full determinism (S3) remains possible at least as a philosophy. S4 is (more easily) 
subject to scrutiny as a part of a physical theory. And indeed, some will find that S3 or S4 explains the 
‘connectedness’ of things in a less mysterious way than S1 (or the Copenhagen interpretation), which 
essentially just accepts it. 
From the point of view of philosophy, one further remarkable point is that S3 offers a solid 
scientific basis for theories such as Spinoza’s; a possible link with oriental philosophies will not have 
escaped from the attention of experts. We refer to Spinoza’s work [30] to remind the reader that there 
a subtle view on free will and human interaction is exposed. On a very personal note, it may therefore 
be utterly relevant for the formidable problems western society faces: the latter is based on a belief in 
the virtually unrestricted freedom of the individual. Which may too simple a picture.                   
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